Why Reid was no dogmatist
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10806673 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mark Boespflug (0000-0002-7837-3320, University of Colorado Boulder, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 196 |
| Issue | 11 |
| Pages | 4511-4525 |
| Publication date | 2019-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-017-1663-x |
| OpenAlex | W2781621742 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 16 |
A priori and a posteriori · Economics · Epistemology · Extant taxon · Metaphysics · Naturalism · Perception · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Variance (accounting) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Warrant and Proper Function
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
I—Crispin Wright
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception
Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology
Belief control and intentionality
Judgment and Justification
No Exception for Belief
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism
Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge
David Hume, common-sense moralist, sceptical metaphysician
Reid and Epistemic Naturalism
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |