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Belief control and intentionality

Bibliographic Data

ID10806412
AuthorsMatthias Steup (0000-0003-0517-9639, Purdue University West Lafayette, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume188
Issue2
Pages145-163
Publication date2012-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSynthese (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-011-9919-3
OpenAlexW2068172106
LanguageEN
Citations received27
References cited10

Control (management) · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Focus (optics) · Intentionality · Metaphilosophy · Metaphysics · Modern philosophy · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Voluntarism (philosophy) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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  • From Doxastic Blame to Doxastic Shame

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  • Defining Wokeness

    J Spencer Atkins•Social Epistemology•2023

  • Internalism and Culpable Irrationality

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  • A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager

    Open Access•Elizabeth G Jackson•Erkenntnis•2023

  • Two Faces of Responsibility for Beliefs

    Open Access•Giulia Luvisotto•Canadian Journal of Philosophy•2022

  • In search of doxastic involuntarism

    Open Access•Matthew Vermaire•Philosophical Studies•2022

  • Acceptance and the ethics of belief

    Open Access•Laura K Soter•Philosophical Studies•2023

  • The epistemic ought-implies-can principle and the ‘can’ of freedom

    Byeong D Lee•Inquiry•2025

  • The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility

    Open Access•Anne Meylan•Theoria•2017

  • Against Doxastic Compatibilism

    Open Access•Rafael Peels, Rik Peels•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2013

  • Against a descriptive vindication of doxastic voluntarism

    Open Access•Nikolaj Nottelmann•Synthese•2017

  • Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism

    Open Access•Timothy Perrine•Synthese•2020

  • Group belief reconceived

    Open Access•Jeroen De Ridder•Synthese•2022

  • Freedom and (theoretical) reason

    Open Access•Margaret Schmitt•Synthese•2015

  • In defense of doxastic blame

    Open Access•Lindsay Rettler•Synthese•2018

  • On some recent moves in defence of doxastic compatibilism

    Open Access•Anthony Robert Booth•Synthese•2014

  • Belief isn’t voluntary, but commitment is

    Open Access•Nicholas Tebben•Synthese•2018

  • Weighing aims in doxastic deliberation

    Open Access•C J Atkinson•Synthese•2021

  • On the analogy of free will and free belief

    Open Access•Verena Wagner•Synthese•2017

  • The illusion of discretion

    Open Access•Kurt Sylvan•Synthese•2016

  • Believing intentionally

    Open Access•Matthias Steup•Synthese•2017

  • Deontology and doxastic control

    Open Access•Nicholas Tebben•Synthese•2014

  • Why Reid was no dogmatist

    Open Access•Mark Boespflug•Synthese•2019

  • Responsibility and Control

    Open Access•John Martin Fischer, Mark Ravizza•Responsibility and Control•1998

  • Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility

    Harry G Frankfurt•The Journal of Philosophy•1969

  • Freedom and Determinism

    Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke et al.•Freedom and Determinism•2004

  • When is the Will Free

    Peter Van Inwagen•Philosophical Perspectives•1989

  • Doxastic freedom

    Open Access•Matthias Steup•Synthese•2008

  • An Introduction to Metaphysics

    J J C Smart, C H Whiteley•The Philosophical Quarterly•1951

  • Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge

    Matthias Steup, William Alston•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1992

  • On Freedom and Determinism

    Isidor Chein•American Psychologist•1965

  • Intentionality

    Open Access•John R Searle, Alessandro Salice•Intentionality•1983

Unique citing works27
Citations per year2.08
Citation span2013 - 2025 (13)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 27

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