Defining Wokeness

Bibliographic Data

ID21503688
AuthorsJ Spencer Atkins (0000-0003-2553-1046, Binghamton University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume37
Issue3
Pages321-338
Publication date2023-05-04
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueSocial Epistemology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0269-1728 • E-ISSN: 1464-5297
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/02691728.2022.2145857
OpenAlexW4317810598
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited54

Rima Basu and I have offered separate accounts of wokeness as an anti-racist ethical concept. Our accounts endorse controversial doctrines in epistemology: doxastic wronging, doxastic voluntarism, and moral encroachment. Many philosophers deny these three views, favoring instead some ordinary standards for epistemic justification. I call this denial the standard view. In this paper, I offer an account of wokeness that is consistent with the standard view. I argue that wokeness is best understood as ‘group epistemic partiality’. The woke person does extra epistemic work before forming a negative belief about a member of an oppressed social group. Just as we do extra epistemic work when forming belief about our friends, so the woke person does for members of oppressed social groups. I first outline the account. I then raise questions about the scope of wokeness and belief formation. After this, I demonstrate that the group partiality view is consistent with the standard view in epistemology. The partiality view, therefore, should appeal to epistemologists who have adopted the standard view because it is consistent with ordinary standards of justification. I conclude that wokeness as a concept in epistemology should not be controversial for those who endorse the standard view

Appeal · Denial · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Political science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology

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