Profiling and Proof
Are Statistics Safe
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21371297 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Greg Gardiner (0000-0002-9343-5155, corresponding author), Georgi Gardiner |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 95 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 161-183 |
| Publication date | 2020-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8191 • E-ISSN: 1469-817X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0031819120000030 |
| OpenAlex | W3017093309 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 31 |
Many theorists hold that outright verdicts based on bare statistical evidence are unwarranted. Bare statistical evidence may support high credence, on these views, but does not support outright belief or legal verdicts of culpability. The vignettes that constitute the lottery paradox and the proof paradox are marshalled to support this claim. Some theorists argue, furthermore, that examples of profiling also indicate that bare statistical evidence is insufficient for warranting outright verdicts. I examine Pritchard's and Buchak's treatments of these three kinds of case. Pritchard argues that his safety condition explains the insufficiency of bare statistical evidence for outright verdicts in each of the three cases, while Buchak argues that her treatment of the distinction between credence and belief explains this. In these discussions the three kinds of cases – lottery, proof paradox, and profiling – are treated alike. The cases are taken to exhibit the same epistemic features. I identity significant overlooked epistemic differences amongst these three cases; these differences cast doubt on Pritchard's explanation of the insufficiency of bare statistical evidence for outright verdicts. Finally, I raise the question of whether we should aim for a unified explanation of the three paradoxes
Credence · Criminology · Culpability · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Lottery · Positive economics · Profiling (computer programming) · Statistical evidence · Statistics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Defining Wokeness
A Causal Safety Criterion for Knowledge
Knowledge, individualised evidence and luck
Just probabilities
Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes
Bare Statistical Evidence and the Right to Security
Statistical evidence and the criminal verdict asymmetry
Bare statistical evidence and the legitimacy of software-based judicial decisions
When statistical evidence is not specific enough
The safe, the sensitive, and the severely tested
Relevance and risk
Probabilistic Knowledge
The Probable and The Provable
Between Probability and Certainty
Belief, credence, and norms
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology
Safety-Based Epistemology
Radical moral encroachment
The paradox of the preface
Trial by Mathematics
Safety and epistemic luck
Unsafe Knowledge
Anti-luck epistemology
Worries about Pritchard’s safety
Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2.2 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2024 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |