Statistical evidence and the criminal verdict asymmetry
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10814044 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Avital Fried (University of Oxford, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 200 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-09 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-022-03947-w |
| OpenAlex | W4308624656 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 36 |
Epistemologists have posed the following puzzle, known as the proof paradox: Why is it intuitively problematic for juries to convict on the basis of statistical evidence and yet intuitively unproblematic for juries to convict on the basis of far less reliable, non-statistical evidence? To answer this question, theorists have explained the exclusion of statistical evidence by arguing that legal proof requires certain epistemic features. In this paper, I make two contributions to the debate. First, I establish the Criminal Verdict Asymmetry, a previously-unarticulated asymmetry between the epistemic norms of guilty and not guilty verdicts. I argue that the prosecution and defense’s different epistemic burdens influence whether statistical evidence can generate the type of verdict each side pursues. Second, I point out a mistake in how theorists have understood the role of statistical evidence in criminal trials. Though epistemologists have primarily focused on whether statistical evidence can generate specific epistemic features required for convictions, I consider whether statistical evidence can demonstrate a lack of such features. I find that there are epistemic advantages to allowing the defense to introduce statistical evidence which can reveal the prosecution’s failure to prove the defendant’s guilt
Asymmetry · Convict · Criminal trial · Criminology · Econometrics · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Mistake · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Physics · Political science · Reasonable Doubt · Spurious relationship · Statistical evidence · Statistics · Verdict · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Jury Decision Making Processes · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology
The Probable and The Provable
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
Trial by Mathematics
Rethinking the Use of Statistical Evidence to Prove Causation in Criminal Cases
Profiling and Proof
Profile Evidence, Fairness, and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions
The Cross‐Race Effect and Eyewitness Identification
Statistical Evidence and Individual Litigants
Naked statistical evidence and incentives for lawful conduct
The Epistemology of Statistical Evidence
Is it a Crime to Belong to a Reference Class
The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations
Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification
Cross-Racial Identifications
Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge
Recent work on the proof paradox
Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |