The epistemic ought-implies-can principle and the ‘can’ of freedom
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335617 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Byeong D Lee (0000-0001-7080-6702, Sungkyunkwan University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Pages | 1-21 |
| Publication date | 2025-04-22 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2025.2495663 |
| OpenAlex | W4409710805 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 20 |
On the epistemic ought-implies-can principle, we have an epistemic duty to believe a proposition only if we can believe it. Whether or not this principle holds depends crucially on how to understand the ‘can’ here. The goal of this paper is to offer a new interpretation on which the ‘can’ is best understood as the ‘can’ of freedom, based on a Kantian account of freedom. This new interpretation has important merits compared with the two most prominent existing interpretations. It fits well with doxastic deontology because the ‘can’ of the principle is understood as not requiring voluntary control over beliefs. Additionally, it aligns with the standard view that doxastic deontology goes well with the deontological conception of justification because the ‘can’ is understood as not standing for cognitive competence, which varies from person to person
Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
The Manipulation Argument and a Kantian account of freedom
Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness
The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification
Believing intentionally
Modest deontologism in epistemology
Belief control and intentionality
Ought' Conversationally Implies `Can
People judge others to have more voluntary control over beliefs than they themselves do
| Highly cited | No |
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