The playing field of empirical facts
On the interrelations between moral and empirical beliefs in reflective equilibrium
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10807752 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Manuel Cordes (0009-0003-4077-0245, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 203 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Publication date | 2024-04-10 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-024-04553-8 |
| OpenAlex | W4394679292 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 22 |
What exactly is the role of empirical beliefs in moral reflective equilibrium (RE)? And if they have a part to play, can changes in our empirical beliefs effectuate changes in the moral principles we adopt? Conversely, can empirical beliefs be adjusted in light of certain moral convictions? While it is generally accepted that empirical background theory is of importance to the method of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE), this article focuses on a different aspect, namely the role of empirical beliefs that is intrinsic to the coherence relation of moral beliefs in any (narrow or wide) conception of RE. First, it is shown that in the application of RE, empirical beliefs are crucial to the procedure of matching principles to considered judgments. Changes in our empirical beliefs may therefore upset the relevant coherence relation and motivate changes in the moral principles we adopt. This more detailed account of the interplay between empirical and moral beliefs can help evaluate the overall philosophical appeal of RE. Finally, it is argued that, at least in WRE, the relation between empirical and moral beliefs need not be a one-way street, that is, moral convictions can provide us with some epistemic means of adjudicating between competing empirical descriptions of the world
Economics · Empirical evidence · Empirical research · Epistemology · Field (mathematics) · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Reflective equilibrium · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
The Way We Reason Now
Justice as Fairness
The Varieties of Necessity
Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering
Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics
The Meta-Justification of Reflective Equilibrium
Rawls on Justification
A Theory of Justice
Justification and truth
The Independence of Moral Theory
Topic Continuity in Conceptual Engineering and Beyond
Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough
Re-engineering contested concepts. A reflective-equilibrium approach
Reflective equilibrium and understanding
Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics
Recent work on reflective equilibrium and method in ethics
| Highly cited | No |
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