The Way We Reason Now

Reflective Equilibrium in Bioethics

Bibliographic Data

ID23564305
AuthorsJohn D Arras (University of Virginia, corresponding author)
EditorsBonnie Steinbock
Year2009
Publication date2009-02-12
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueThe Oxford handbook of bioethics (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199562411.003.0003
OpenAlexW2691646785
ISBN9780199562411
LanguageEN
Citations received10

This article begins with some preliminary remarks about the general features and basic varieties of reflective equilibrium (RE) in moral reflection. It then considers a couple of preliminary doubts about this method. One of these doubts claims that the most plausible interpretation of RE is so comprehensive that it risks paralyzing our thinking, while the other claims that this same version of RE is insufficiently determinate in practical contexts and will thus fail to be sufficiently action-guiding. The article then explicates the sense in which RE qualifies as a coherence theory of justification, and considers several objections to RE that flow from its reliance on the putative connection between coherence and moral justification.

Action (physics) · Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) · Connection (principal bundle) · Economics · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Law and economics · Positive economics · Reflection (computer programming) · Reflective equilibrium · Sociology · Computer Science · Ethics in medical practice · Mathematics · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy

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