Truthmaker puzzles for one-level physicalists

Bibliographic Data

ID10810608
AuthorsUmut Baysan (University of Oxford, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume200
Issue5
Publication date2022-09-07
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSynthese (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-022-03734-7
OpenAlexW4295980680
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited25

According to one-level physicalism, reality is exhausted by fundamental physical entities and properties. This position is sometimes defended on the basis of the truthmaker view of ontological commitment. Accordingly, physicalists can affirm higher-level truths without ontologically committing to any higher-level properties or states of affairs; fundamental physical states of affairs serve as truthmakers of all truths that have truthmakers, and a physicalist’s ontology should consist of nothing but the fundamental physical states of affairs and their constituents. In this paper, I raise a problem for one-level physicalists who defend their views by appealing to the truthmaker view of ontological commitment. I argue that the truthmaker view faces certain puzzles the solutions of which clash with the main tenets of one-level physicalism. I conclude that either truthmaking is not a good guide to ontological commitment or one-level physicalism cannot be defended on the basis of the truthmaker view

Epistemology · Metaphysics · Nothing · Ontology · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Physicalism · Supervenience · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications

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