Causal Interpretation in Systems of Equations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10812679 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jim Woodward (California Institute of Technology, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 121 |
| Issue | 1-2 |
| Pages | 199-247 |
| Publication date | 1999-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1023/a:1005242000548 |
| OpenAlex | W1512002850 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 22 |
Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Advanced Causal Inference Techniques · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Philosophy
What Is a Mechanism? A Counterfactual Account
Making Things Happen
Causation in biology
Healthy, wealthy, and wise? Tests for direct causal paths between health and socioeconomic status
Against Modularity, the Causal Markov Condition, and Any Link Between the Two
Methodological Individualism, Explanation, and Invariance
Intervening on structure
Mechanisms, the interventionist theory, and the ability to use causal relationships
Indeterminism and the Causal Markov Condition
An Action-Related Theory of Causality
Causation, Prediction, and Search
Causal Asymmetries
The Probability Approach in Econometrics
Causal diagrams for empirical research
Tetrad and SEM
Causal Independence and Faithfulness
Explanation, Invariance, and Intervention
Causation, Robustness, and EPR
Can Causes be Reduced to Correlations
Causality and Temporal Order in Macroeconomics or Why Even Economists Don't Know How to Get Causes from Probabilities
Scientific Explanation
Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences
Conditioning and Intervening
Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition
Causation as a Secondary Quality
Graphs, Causality, and Structural Equation Models
| Citations per year | 0.42 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2002 - 2018 (17) |
| Highly cited | No |