Strategic Determinism in Technology Selection

Strategic Determinism in Technology Selection: The Electric Battleship and U.S. Naval-Industrial Relations WILLIAM M. MCBRIDE In May 1904, Admiral Jackie Fisher, the driving force behind the creation of the British dreadnought battleship, declared that ship design must be dictated by strategy.1 Fisher’s pronouncement appears axiomatic, but warship design was (and remains) a compromise re­ sulting from internal service disputes over the “correct” strategic doc­ trine, the level of autonomy engineering specialists were allowed with regard to military decisions, and the influence of political-industrial alliances. In striving for a naval renaissance in the 1870s, American naval officers rejected their tradition of commerce raiding and blockade warfare for an ambitious global strategy—a strategy that required a modern steel navy that comprised “a few vessels that we will not be afraid or ashamed to show to foreign powers.”2 A favoritejustification for this global strategy was the need to protect American commercial expansion around the Pacific rim.3 But operations in the vast Pacific mandated territorial acquisitions for coaling stations or compromises in warship design? The ill-fated USS Maine, commissioned in 1895 as Dr. McBride is an assistant professor of history at James Madison University. He earned his Ph.D. in the history of science and technology from Johns Hopkins University and is a former Olin Fellow in military history and strategic studies at Yale University. 'Admiral John Fisher to the Committee of Seven, May 1904, reprinted in The Papers ofAdmiral SirJohn Fisher, vol. 1, ed. Lieutenant P. K. Kemp, RN (London, 1960), p. 40. "Ensign Robert Welles, USN, to his mother, February 4, 1886, quoted in Peter H. Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York, 1972), p. 301. ’The American navy’s strategic interest in the Pacific Ocean can be traced back to the commerce raiding conducted by the frigate Essex during the War of 1812. The push for U.S. naval expansion, as a result of the professionalization of the late-19th-century American officer corps, is a theme that runs throughout Karsten (n. 2 above); for its relation with commercial enterprise, see pp. 300—317. ’Initially, the question was moot since Congress, fearing imperialistic adventurism, restricted the steaming range of the navy’s first three battleships appropriated in© 1992 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved. 0040-165X/92/3302-0002J01.00 248 The Electric Battleship and U.S. Naval-Industrial Relations 249 a “second-class battleship,” was originally designed to carry sails, in addition to steam engines, to extend her cruising radius.3 * * The acqui­ sition of the Philippines in 1898 and the emergence ofJapan as a rival Pacific naval power after it vanquished Tsarist Russia in the 1904—05 war underscored the geopolitical factors governing the design of U.S. naval propulsion technology. Without a worldwide coaling network like the British, the United States required warships (as it would later require strategic bombers) capable of long-range operations. Captain C. W. Dyson of the navy’s Bureau of Steam Engineering described the unique situation facing the U.S. Navy: The former [European] nations were providing for operations in confined waters such as the North Sea and the Mediterranean, where they were never far from their bases. . . . Under the conditions foreseen high speed was more desireable than cruising radius, and the latter was sacrificed. Turning now to the conditions which confront us, we see . . . the entire line from Seattle to Panama to the southward, and from Seattle to Honolulu, thence to Guam and on to the Philippines and still further to Samoa, requiring our attention. The areas to be covered are great and the distances to bases and from base to base in some cases are magnificent. Fuel economy is of the highest value, even predominates over speed, as the refueling problem becomes a serious one and the greater our bunker capacities and the fuel economy of our machinery, by so much is the seriousness of the problem reduced.6 By 1909, American battleships were being designed with a steaming radius of 10,000 nautical miles, almost double that of the longestranged battleship, USS Oregon, which had

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