Interpretivism, First-Person Authority, and Confabulation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10928320 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eivind Balsvik (University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 4-5 |
| Pages | 311-329 |
| Publication date | 2017-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of the Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-3931 • E-ISSN: 1552-7441 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0048393117705297 |
| OpenAlex | W2613806107 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 20 |
Psychological experiments allegedly show that people have a tendency to confabulate explanations of their behavior, because their conscious selves do not know why they do what they do, and therefore create the explanations that make most sense. This article explains why confabulation is neither a threat to interpretivist social science nor a threat to the presumption of first-person authority in Davidson’s interpretation theory. The reason is that the interpretative endeavor, which is necessary in order to identify and provide evidence for confabulation is governed by a presumption of first-person authority. Explanations of confabulation thus depend on prior interpretations
Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Confabulation (neural networks) · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Political science · Presumption · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
Thought and Talk
The Opacity of MindAn Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge
The Significance of Consciousness
Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task
Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief
Self-interpreting animals
Telling more than we can know
Reply to commentary by Moore and Haggard
How something can be said about telling more than we can know
A gap in Nisbett and Wilson’s findings? A first-person access to our cognitive processes
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
| Citations per year | 0.6 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |