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Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information

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Bibliographic Data

ID10928792
AuthorsRandolph Sloof (0000-0002-8113-1269, Tinbergen Institute, corresponding author)
Year1997
Volume91
Issue2
Pages199-207
Publication date1997-04-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePublic Choice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1023/a:1004964105609
OpenAlexW1513602271
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited3

Argument (complex analysis) · Complete information · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Macroeconomics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Positive economics · Proposition · Public finance · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Philosophy

  • Choosing among signalling equilibria in lobbying games

    Open Access•Eric Rasmusen•Public Choice•1997

  • The European Commission’s environmental stakeholder consultations

    Open Access•Henrik Hermansson•Interest Groups & Advocacy•2016

  • A mixed motive approach to lobbying

    Open Access•Freya Aitken‐Turff, Nigel Jackson•Journal of Public Affairs•2006

  • Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

    Jeffrey S Banks, Jeremy Sobel et al.•Econometrica•1987

  • Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information

    Open Access•Eric Rasmusen•Public Choice•1993

Citations per year0.1
Citation span1997 - 2016 (20)
Highly citedNo

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