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Choosing among signalling equilibria in lobbying games

A reply to Sloof

Bibliographic Data

ID11607993
AuthorsEric Rasmusen (corresponding author)
Year1997
Volume91
Issue2
Pages209-214
Publication date1997-04-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePublic Choice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101
PublisherSpringer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1023/a:1004903313621
OpenAlexW1555690637
LanguageEN
References cited5

Economics · Equilibrium selection · Game theory · Incentive · Macroeconomics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Public finance · Repeated game · Strategy · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems

  • Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

    Jeffrey S Banks, Jeremy Sobel et al.•Econometrica•1987

  • Games with randomly disturbed payoffs

    Open Access•John C Harsanyi•International Journal of Game…•1973

  • Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

    In-Koo Cho, In‐Koo Cho et al.•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1987

  • Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information

    Open Access•Eric Rasmusen•Public Choice•1993

  • Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information

    Open Access•Randolph Sloof•Public Choice•1997

Highly citedNo

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