Eric Rasmusen
Biographic Data
| ID | 1017643 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eric Rasmusen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eric |
| FAMILY NAME | Rasmusen |
| SIGNATURE | RASMUSEN E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Indiana University Bloomington |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 47 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 14 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1989 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Ostracism in Japan
Informal social sanctions such as ostracism are the primary means of controlling deviance in communities. Formal legal sanctions are a costly back-up. Yet outside of university laboratories, studies of ostracism barely exist. We examine legal cases brought by targets of ostracism in Japan, encompassing nearly all the non-trivial reported opinions. The cases do not involve villagers who actually offended their community. Instead, most plaintiffs a…
Lowering the Bar to Raise the Bar
By easing the difficulty of the Japanese bar-exam equivalent, recent changes increased the quality of young lawyers. The result is counterintuitive, but a relaxation in a licensing standard can have this effect if it lowers the costs to taking a test enough to increase the number and quality of the people willing to go to the trouble of sitting for it. We explore the theoretical circumstances under which this phenomenon can occur and discuss the …
More dropouts, higher standards
Observed choice and optimism in estimating the effects of government policies
Choosing among signalling equilibria in lobbying games
OnGame Theory and the Law
Michael Alexeev* Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, & Randall Picker, Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. xii + 330 pages. $45.00. On 18 January 1996 the Indiana University Law and Economics Lunch Bunch1 met to discuss the book Game Theory and the Law by Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, and Randall Picker. Professor Dau-Schmidt wanted to review the book and, being rather a strong believer in social cooperation, thoug…
Cheap bribes and the corruption ban
Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information
Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives
In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, changing one player's payoffs affects only the other player's equilibrium strategy mix. This `Payoff Irrelevance Proposition' (PIP) appears to undercut the main foundations of economic policy analysis since, allegedly, equilibrium behavior will not respond to changes in incentives. We show, in contrast, that: (1) When the policy-maker has the first move in a sequential-move game, the PIP does not hold. (2) Ev…
Heterogeneous Players and Specialized Models
Game theory has been criticized as neglecting key aspects of individual behavior and as relying too heavily on special assumptions. It can, in fact, handle individual heterogeneity if the modeler is willing to carefully specify how people are different, but to the extent that such things as heterogeneity and culture are important, the desire for a single unified model is impossible to satisfy. At the same time, game theory's approach is very usef…
Extending the economic theory of regulation to the form of policy
Playing Games with the Law
In the last two decades, the theory of games has increasingly dominated microeconomic theory. Frank Fisher recently asserted that game theory has become "the premier fashionable tool of microtheorists":\nThat ascendancy appears fairly complete. Bright young theorists today tend to think of every problem in game-theoretic terms .... Every department feels it needs at least one game theorist or at least one theorist who thinks in game-theoretic ter…
Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism
Games and Information
Journal Article Games and Information: An Introduction to Games Theory Get access Games and Information: An Introduction to Games Theory. By ERIC RASMUSEN. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. Pp. 352. £25.00 hardback. ISBN 0 631 15709 3.) Hyun Song Shin Hyun Song Shin University of Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 397, 1 September 1989, Pages 864–865, https://doi.or…
Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information
Cheap bribes and the corruption ban
Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives
In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, changing one player's payoffs affects only the other player's equilibrium strategy mix. This `Payoff Irrelevance Proposition' (PIP) appears to undercut the main foundations of economic policy analysis since, allegedly, equilibrium behavior will not respond to changes in incentives. We show, in contrast, that: (1) When the policy-maker has the first move in a sequential-move game, the PIP does not hold. (2) Ev…
Lowering the Bar to Raise the Bar
By easing the difficulty of the Japanese bar-exam equivalent, recent changes increased the quality of young lawyers. The result is counterintuitive, but a relaxation in a licensing standard can have this effect if it lowers the costs to taking a test enough to increase the number and quality of the people willing to go to the trouble of sitting for it. We explore the theoretical circumstances under which this phenomenon can occur and discuss the …
Observed choice and optimism in estimating the effects of government policies
Heterogeneous Players and Specialized Models
Game theory has been criticized as neglecting key aspects of individual behavior and as relying too heavily on special assumptions. It can, in fact, handle individual heterogeneity if the modeler is willing to carefully specify how people are different, but to the extent that such things as heterogeneity and culture are important, the desire for a single unified model is impossible to satisfy. At the same time, game theory's approach is very usef…
OnGame Theory and the Law
Michael Alexeev* Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, & Randall Picker, Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. xii + 330 pages. $45.00. On 18 January 1996 the Indiana University Law and Economics Lunch Bunch1 met to discuss the book Game Theory and the Law by Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, and Randall Picker. Professor Dau-Schmidt wanted to review the book and, being rather a strong believer in social cooperation, thoug…
Extending the economic theory of regulation to the form of policy
Playing Games with the Law
In the last two decades, the theory of games has increasingly dominated microeconomic theory. Frank Fisher recently asserted that game theory has become "the premier fashionable tool of microtheorists":\nThat ascendancy appears fairly complete. Bright young theorists today tend to think of every problem in game-theoretic terms .... Every department feels it needs at least one game theorist or at least one theorist who thinks in game-theoretic ter…
Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism
Games and Information
Journal Article Games and Information: An Introduction to Games Theory Get access Games and Information: An Introduction to Games Theory. By ERIC RASMUSEN. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. Pp. 352. £25.00 hardback. ISBN 0 631 15709 3.) Hyun Song Shin Hyun Song Shin University of Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 397, 1 September 1989, Pages 864–865, https://doi.or…
Playing Games with the Law
In the last two decades, the theory of games has increasingly dominated microeconomic theory. Frank Fisher recently asserted that game theory has become "the premier fashionable tool of microtheorists":\nThat ascendancy appears fairly complete. Bright young theorists today tend to think of every problem in game-theoretic terms .... Every department feels it needs at least one game theorist or at least one theorist who thinks in game-theoretic ter…
Extending the economic theory of regulation to the form of policy
Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives
In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, changing one player's payoffs affects only the other player's equilibrium strategy mix. This `Payoff Irrelevance Proposition' (PIP) appears to undercut the main foundations of economic policy analysis since, allegedly, equilibrium behavior will not respond to changes in incentives. We show, in contrast, that: (1) When the policy-maker has the first move in a sequential-move game, the PIP does not hold. (2) Ev…
Heterogeneous Players and Specialized Models
Game theory has been criticized as neglecting key aspects of individual behavior and as relying too heavily on special assumptions. It can, in fact, handle individual heterogeneity if the modeler is willing to carefully specify how people are different, but to the extent that such things as heterogeneity and culture are important, the desire for a single unified model is impossible to satisfy. At the same time, game theory's approach is very usef…
Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information
Cheap bribes and the corruption ban
Choosing among signalling equilibria in lobbying games
OnGame Theory and the Law
Michael Alexeev* Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, & Randall Picker, Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. xii + 330 pages. $45.00. On 18 January 1996 the Indiana University Law and Economics Lunch Bunch1 met to discuss the book Game Theory and the Law by Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, and Randall Picker. Professor Dau-Schmidt wanted to review the book and, being rather a strong believer in social cooperation, thoug…
Observed choice and optimism in estimating the effects of government policies
More dropouts, higher standards
Lowering the Bar to Raise the Bar
By easing the difficulty of the Japanese bar-exam equivalent, recent changes increased the quality of young lawyers. The result is counterintuitive, but a relaxation in a licensing standard can have this effect if it lowers the costs to taking a test enough to increase the number and quality of the people willing to go to the trouble of sitting for it. We explore the theoretical circumstances under which this phenomenon can occur and discuss the …
Ostracism in Japan
Informal social sanctions such as ostracism are the primary means of controlling deviance in communities. Formal legal sanctions are a costly back-up. Yet outside of university laboratories, studies of ostracism barely exist. We examine legal cases brought by targets of ostracism in Japan, encompassing nearly all the non-trivial reported opinions. The cases do not involve villagers who actually offended their community. Instead, most plaintiffs a…
Economics (10 works) · Political science (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Microeconomics (7 works) · Game theory (5 works) · Mathematical economics (5 works) · Public finance (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works)