Heterogeneous Players and Specialized Models
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5917660 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eric Rasmusen (University of California, Los Angeles, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 83-94 |
| Publication date | 1992-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rationality and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1043463192004001010 |
| OpenAlex | W2093849072 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 8 |
Game theory has been criticized as neglecting key aspects of individual behavior and as relying too heavily on special assumptions. It can, in fact, handle individual heterogeneity if the modeler is willing to carefully specify how people are different, but to the extent that such things as heterogeneity and culture are important, the desire for a single unified model is impossible to satisfy. At the same time, game theory's approach is very useful for building specialized models
Computer security · Economics · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
Games with randomly disturbed payoffs
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders
Games and Preference
The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems
Indispensable Framework or Just another Ideology
| Citations per year | 0.07 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1996 - 1999 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |