A distributive N-amendment game with endogenous agenda formation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10929642 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Elizabeth Maggie Penn (0000-0002-2018-4367, Harvard University Press, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 136 |
| Issue | 1-2 |
| Pages | 201-213 |
| Publication date | 2008-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Public Choice (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11127-008-9291-0 |
| OpenAlex | W1998220960 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 12 |
Distributive property · Economics · Game theory · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Minimax · Nash equilibrium · Political science · Politics · Public finance · Sequential game · Set (abstract data type · Strategy · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics
Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions
Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting
Sophisticated Sincerity
Bargaining in Legislatures
| Citations per year | 0.4 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2016 - 2020 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |