Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership
Implications for property rights
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10929751 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Leonid Polishchuk (0000-0003-4669-2025, National Research University Higher School of Economics, corresponding author), Georgiy Syunyaev (0000-0002-4391-6313, National Research University Higher School of Economics, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 162 |
| Issue | 1-2 |
| Pages | 159-182 |
| Publication date | 2015-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Public Choice (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11127-014-0210-2 |
| OpenAlex | W2135246840 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 76 |
Asset (computer security · Business · Economic system · Economics · Expropriation · Incentive · Law and economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political science · Property (philosophy · Property rights · Public finance · Corruption and Economic Development · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
National Borders and the Size of Nations
The Politics
Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis
Violence and Social Orders
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Pillars of Prosperity
Political Competition, Policy and Growth
Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics
How does political instability affect economic growth?
Property Rights and Economic Development
Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
Political instability and economic growth
Approximating the bias of the LSDV estimator for dynamic unbalanced panel data models
Estimating dynamic panel data models
Why Nations Fail
Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"
On bias, inconsistency, and efficiency of various estimators in dynamic panel data models
Institutions
Institutions Rule
Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data
New Tools in Comparative Political Economy
Why Nations Fail
Veto Players
The Rise and Decline of Nations
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth
Dictators and Dictatorships
Polarization, Politics, and Property Rights
The Logic of Political Survival
Corruption and Government
Institutions and Economic Performance
Policy Volatility, Institutions, and Economic Growth
Inequality and Institutions
Top Incomes in the Long Run of History
Of Rule and Revenue
Inequality does cause underdevelopment
Polarization, Politics and Property Rights
Democracy and dictatorship revisited
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Institutional quality and the tenure of autocrats
The hazard rate of political regimes
Understanding institutional change
Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes
Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database
The Dynamics of Political Compromise
Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Scarcity, Conflicts, and Cooperation
How Closely Do Top Income Shares Track Other Measures of Inequality
Institutions and the Resource Curse
Winners Take All
Democracy with Adjectives
Political foundations of the resource curse
Do Institutions Cause Growth
Elite Settlements
Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective
Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation
Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,3 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2021 (6) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |