Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3474150 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rui J P De Figueiredo (University of California, Berkeley, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 96 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 321-333 |
| Publication date | 2002-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055402000199 |
| OpenAlex | W2146780019 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 73 |
| References cited | 23 |
Why are government bureaus not necessarily organized to implement policy effectively? One view holds that a main culprit is political uncertainty. Elected officials know that they will not hold office forever, so they use "insulating" structures that constrain bureaucratic discretion, making bureaus less subject to sabotage but also less effective. I revise this theory by modeling how public officials choose administrative structures. I show that in systems with few veto points, groups will be most likely to act cooperatively on policy when political uncertainty is greatest. In contrast, in systems with many veto points, only electorally weak groups will insulate policies from future interference, therefore shifting focus from uncertainty to electoral strength. Because the conditions that lead to policy insulation are rare, electoral competition should not be thought of as a primary cause of bureaucratic inefficiency
Bureaucracy · Competition (biology · Discretion · Economics · Government (linguistics · Inefficiency · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Veto · Corruption and Economic Development · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
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Federalism and the Market
Agency Design and Distributive Politics
The Influence of Redistributive Politics on the Decision Making of Quasi-autonomous Organizations. The Case of Infrastructures-Transport (Quebec–Canada)
Pandemic Shocks and Household Spending
Mayoral preferences for delegation in collaborative arrangements
The perceived effectiveness of collaborative approaches to address domestic violence
Durable Policy, Political Accountability, and Active Waste
Corruption and Reform in India
Political Insulation and Legislative Interventions
U.S State Tax and Expenditure Limitations
The Same, But Different
Strategic Delegation? How Legislative Political Elites Respond to Electoral Uncertainty
Adam Smith or Machiavelli? Political incentives for contracting out local public services
Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership
The incumbent’s preference for imperfect commitment
Tax earmarking, party politics and gubernatorial veto
Electoral Turnover and Government Efficiency
Reversals of Capacity
The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism
Can impact assessments tame legislative drift? Event history analysis of modifications of laws across Europe
Political Cycles and Organizational Life Cycles
The Rise and Fall of Radical Civil Service Reform in the U.S. States
Elections and reform
Political Insulation, Information Exchange, and Interest Group Access to the Bureaucracy
The Impact of Administrative Structure on the Ability of City Governments to Overcome Functional Collective Action Dilemmas
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Bureaucratic Packing in the Brazilian Amazon
From Classical to Progressive Liberalism
Civil Service and Patronage in Bureaucracies
The Formal Independence of Regulators
Do parties matter in delegation? Partisan preferences and the creation of regulatory agencies inEurope
Themulti‐agenciesdilemma of delegation
Budgeting Rules and Program Outcomes
The electoral costs of policy commitments
The distinctive politics of campaign finance reform
Constraining a Shadowy Future
Delegation Dilemmas
Crises, investments, and political institutions
Veto players and policy adaptability
Power sharing with weak institutions
Federal employee unionization and presidential control of the bureaucracy
Delegation and political turnover
On the separation of executive and legislative powers
Contingent technocracy
The Administrative Organization of Sustainability Within Local Government
Partisan Politics and Institutional Choice in Public Bureaucracies
Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and Political Stability
When Do Interest Groups Contact Bureaucrats Rather than Politicians? Evidence on Fire Alarms and Smoke Detectors from Japan
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Government turnover
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After Enactment
To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive Order Longevity
Veto Institutions, Hostage‐Taking, and Tacit Cooperation
Change, Continuity, and the Evolution of the Law
Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts
Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control
Democracy by Deterrence
Commitment Problems in Alliance Formation
The Politics of Agency Death
When Will New Programs be Mandatory? Determinants of the Decision Between the Mandatory and Discretionary Budget Designs
Delegation and Discretion in Anticipation of Coalitional Drift
The Inefficient Use of Power
Competing for Transparency
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Fluctuating fortunes
Game Theory and Political Theory
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The logic of delegation
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A Course in Microeconomic Theory
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Pivotal politics
The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion
Decision Making in Political Systems
Broadcasting and Government
Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action
Political Control Versus Expertise
Miti and the Japanese Miracle. The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975
| Unique citing works | 73 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,17 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2025 (23) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 73 |