Budgeting Rules and Program Outcomes
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6366120 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Stuart Kasdin (0000-0003-4820-6625, City of Goleta, California, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2018 |
| Volumen | 78 |
| Número | 5 |
| Páginas | 759-771 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2018-01-12 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Public Administration Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0033-3352 • E-ISSN: 1540-6210 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/puar.12908 |
| OpenAlex | W2783626437 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 39 |
It is not efficient for a budget system either to enable excessively frequent changes in programs and tax policies or to be rigid and unresponsive. Program durability is one measure of how a budget system weighs the competing goals of resoluteness and responsiveness. The federal budget has different processes—mandatory and discretionary spending and tax expenditures—each based in separate congressional committees and relying on separate procedures. This article examines the budget systems' durability. One finding is that mandatory spending programs and tax expenditures are more durable than programs backed by discretionary spending. However, while programs targeted to vulnerable populations and supporting long‐term planning, such as in income support and health, might benefit from durability, these programs display shorter durability, not longer. While displaying greater durability, tax expenditures do respond to changes in different economic sectors, based on the changes in spending of other budget systems
Balanced budget · Business · Durability · Economics · Federal budget · Fiscal year · Political science · Public economics · Computer Science · Finance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Policy and Administration Research
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| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,25 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2018 - 2021 (4) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |