Reform of the United Nations Security Council
Equity and efficiency
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10930561 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew Gould (0000-0003-1593-0991, University of Westminster, corresponding author), Matthew D Rablen (0000-0002-3521-096X, University of Sheffield) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 173 |
| Issue | 1-2 |
| Pages | 145-168 |
| Publication date | 2017-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Public Choice (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11127-017-0468-2 |
| OpenAlex | W3123934012 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 43 |
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is critical to global peace and security, yet more than 20 years of negotiations over its reform have proved fruitless. We use recent advances in the theory of a priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of the implications for democratic equity and efficiency of the “structural reforms” contained within 11 current reform proposals, as well as the separate effect of expansion of the UNSC membership. Only one reform proposal–a weakening of the veto power for Permanent Members by requiring two negative votes for a veto to be effective—robustly dominates the status quo against our measures of equity and efficiency. Several proposed structural reforms may actually worsen the issues they ostensibly claim to resolve
Democracy · Economics · Equity (law · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Power sharing · Public economics · Public finance · Security council · Status quo · Veto · Voting · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting
Econometric policy evaluation
Understanding Procedural Justice and Its Impact on Business Organizations
A more secure world
Security Council Reform
Eyewitness to a Genocide
United Nations reform
A priori voting power distribution under contemporary Security Council reform proposals
Compromise and Credibility
Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union
The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council
Equitable representation in councils
Proposals for UN Security Council Reform
Voting in International Economic Organizations
Comparison of Weighted Voting Formulas for the United Nations
Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council
The Evaluation of Weighted Voting Schemes for the United Nations General Assembly
Selective Weighted Voting in the UN General Assembly
In Defence of Voting Power Analysis
The Theoretical Limits of Maximum Distortion
Entitlement Quotients as a Vehicle for United Nations Reform
Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam
The weighted voting rule in the EU's Council of Ministers, 1958-1995
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,6 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2024 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |