Bargaining in legislatures over private and public goods with endogenous recognition
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10930596 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hakan Genc (0000-0003-2573-4564, University of Bologna), Serkan Kucuksenel (0000-0002-6703-1157, Middle East Technical University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 181 |
| Issue | 3-4 |
| Pages | 351-373 |
| Publication date | 2019-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Public Choice (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11127-019-00661-z |
| OpenAlex | W2907927446 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 24 |
Distributive property · Economics · Law and economics · Legislature · Macroeconomics · Microeconomics · Patience · Political science · Private good · Public economics · Public finance · Public good · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Three-party competition in parliamentary democracy with proportional representation
Decision costs in legislative bargaining
Distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Congress
Bargaining in Legislatures
Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods
A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice
| Highly cited | No |
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