Strategy-proofness of a class of Borda rules
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10930768 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Manimay Sen (University of Canterbury, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1984 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 251-285 |
| Publication date | 1984-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Public Choice (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/bf00118936 |
| OpenAlex | W1989753764 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 33 |
Class (philosophy · Economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · New class · Point (geometry · Public finance · Ranking (information retrieval · Scope (computer science · Social choice theory · Artificial Intelligence · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics
Social Choice Theory
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions
An axiomatization of Borda's rule
Manipulation of Voting Schemes
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
Decision Theory and Social Ethics. Issues in Social Choice
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.09 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2004 (11) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |