Presidential Control and Turnover in Regulatory Personnel

Bibliographic Data

ID11104181
AuthorsKathleen M Doherty (New York University, New York City, USA), Kathleen Doherty (0000-0002-0122-0123, New York University, corresponding author), David E Lewis (0000-0002-0803-0074, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA), Scott Limbocker (0000-0002-6477-8255, U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY, USA)
Year2019
Volume51
Issue10
Pages1606-1630
Publication date2019-11-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAdministration & Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0095-3997 • E-ISSN: 1552-3039
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0095399719875458
OpenAlexW2974000060
LanguageEN
Citations received17
References cited32

Career executives often occupy administrative positions that determine the pace and content of policy, such as those responsible for developing regulations. Yet, presidential administrations need control over these positions to achieve policy aims. This article considers the extent to which new presidential administrations marginalize career executives in key regulatory positions by transferring responsibilities to another individual and whether the mere expectation of political conflict with a new administration drives career regulators from their positions. Using unique new data on 866 career regulators that led major rulemaking efforts between 1995 and 2013, we demonstrate that turnover among career executives in key regulatory positions increases following a party change in the White House. Turnover also increases during a presidential election year, but this effect is conditioned by bureaucrats’ expectations of the election outcome. Finally, career executives are more likely to depart in response to favorable labor market conditions. Given our findings that turnover in regulatory responsibilities is driven both by presidential marginalization and strategic exit by bureaucrats, we conclude with implications for presidential efforts to control the administrative state

Administration (probate law · Control (management · Economics · Management · Pace · Political science · Politics · Presidential election · Presidential system · Public relations · Regulatory state · Rulemaking · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies

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