Policy Influence, Agency-Specific Expertise, and Exit in the Federal Service
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6294169 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anthony M Bertelli (0000-0002-0756-5691, Southern California University for Professional Studies), David E Lewis (0000-0002-0803-0074, Vanderbilt University) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 223-245 |
| Publication date | 2013-04-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1053-1858 • E-ISSN: 1477-9803 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/jopart/mus044 |
| OpenAlex | W2093599936 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 48 |
| References cited | 20 |
Executive turnover influences agency performance, policy implementation, and ultimately the success of legislative delegations. We argue that turnover intention is a function of labor market opportunities - specifically, outside employment opportunities and the acquisition of nontransferable, agency-specific human capital - as well as perceptions about the way in which political decisions have affected federal executive influence over policy-making. Statistical evidence for these claims is provided using data from the 2007-2008 Survey on the Future of Government Service, the largest ever survey of US federal executives. Agency-specific human capital drives down turnover intention in our estimates. The availability of outside options has the opposite effect except in cases where the executive has invested a lot in agency-specific human capital. Turnover intention increases when an agency's senior executives have little influence over policy. We draw out the implications of these findings for our understanding of federal labor markets, the construction of civil service systems, and the politicization of executive branch agencies
Agency (philosophy · Business · Economics · Government (linguistics · Human capital · Legislature · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Service (business · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Policy and Administration Research · Law · Marketing · Public Administration
The interactive effects of professionalism and politicization
Does politicization influence senior public officials’ work attitudes? Different forms and effects of politicization in the civil service
Proponents, Caretakers, and the Dynamics of Administrative Leadership Turnover in U.S. Executive Agencies
Perceptions of Political Discrimination and Political Activity Coercion in the Federal Service
Mission Match and Organizational Satisfaction
Quitting in Protest
Budget institutions and government effectiveness
Understanding Vacancy Time
Politics and the permanency of permanent secretaries
Is Turnover Relationship to Performance Linear Or U-Inverted? A Systematic Literature Review
The more expertise the better? Examining the impact of policy venue specialization on environmental policy compliance
Bureaucratic Responsiveness and Legitimacy
Between Merit and Patronage
Vacancies among appointees in U.S. federal agencies
Politicization, bureaucratic closedness in personnel policy, and turnover intention
Interbranch Competition Over Control of Federal Agencies and the Selection of Career Executives
Presidential rhetoric, agency turnover, and the importance of salience to bureaucratic leadership
The Politicization Conversation
Loyalty–Competence Trade‐offs for Top U.S. Federal Bureaucratic Leaders in the Administrative Presidency Era
The Contemporary Presidency
Interpersonal Connections and Career Mobility in Bureaucratic Labor Markets
Presidential Control and Turnover in Regulatory Personnel
The Implications of Loper Bright for Bureaucratic Human Capital
Job Vacancy and Organizational Performance
Understanding Employee Turnover in the Public Sector
A taste for government employment also rests on its political flavor
Evaluating turnover intention as a proxy for behavior in the federal public service
Holding AI Accountable Like Herding Cats
Does the Front Line Reflect the Party Line? The Politicization of Punishment and Prison Officers’ Perspectives Towards Incarceration
Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding
Speaking truth to power
Politicization and Expertise
Bureaucratic Investments in Expertise
Citizens' perceptions of the legitimacy of independent agencies
Bureaucratic Professionalization is a Contagious Process Inside Government
What Explains Agency Heads’ Length of Tenure? Testing Managerial Background, Performance, and Political Environment Effects
Bureaucrats in Campaigns
The Rise of Court Government? Testing the Centralisation of Power Thesis with Longitudinal Data from Canada
Federal employee unionization and presidential control of the bureaucracy
Executive Control and Turnover in the Senior Executive Service
Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the US Federal Government
Partisan Politics and Institutional Choice in Public Bureaucracies
Agency Performance Challenges and Agency Politicization
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty with Multiple Exit Options
Bureaucratic Politics
The Political Dynamics of Bureaucratic Turnover
Polarization and the Ties That Bind
The politics of senior bureaucratic turnover in the Westminster tradition
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy
Explaining Turnover Intention in State Government
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models
Layoffs and Lemons
Continuity, Competence, and the Succession of Senate‐Confirmed Agency Appointees, 1989‐2009
Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover
Turnover and the Quiet Crisis in the Federal Civil Service
The Motivational Bases of Public Service
Determinants of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention
The Ties that Bind
Employee Turnover and Organizational Performance
Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Pay
Slackers and Zealots
The Appointments Dilemma
Separated Powers in the United States
| Citations per year | 3.43 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Highly cited | No |