Innovation in War
Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11158331 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James A Russell (0000-0003-1041-3717, Naval Postgraduate School, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 595-624 |
| Publication date | 2010-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Strategic Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0140-2390 • E-ISSN: 1743-937X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01402390.2010.489715 |
| OpenAlex | W2017933770 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 21 |
| References cited | 11 |
This article analyzes operations by three battalions conducting counterinsurgency, or COIN, operations in Iraq over the period from July 2005 through March 2007: the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (1–7) along the Iraq–Syrian border in the first half of 2006; the 1st Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment (1–37) battalion operating in south-central Ramadi in the fall of 2006; and the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, or 2-1, operating in eastern Mosul in 2005–06. The empirical evidence presented in these cases suggest that, contrary to popular perceptions, the units successfully innovated in war – a process largely executed organically within the units themselves. Innovation is defined here as the development of new organizational capacities not initially present when the units deployed into the theater. The evidence presented in these cases suggests that the innovation process enabled these units to successfully transition from organizations structured and trained for conventional military operations to organizations that developed an array of new organizational capacities for full-spectrum combat operations. The units in this study developed these new capacitites largely on their own initiative
Infantry · Management · Operations management · Political science · Anthropology: Ethics, History, Culture · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Engineering · Law · Military History and Strategy
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| Unique citing works | 21 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,31 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2022 (13) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 21 |