Salt and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11262332 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Stanley Sienkiewicz (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1978 |
| Volume | 2 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 84 |
| Publication date | 1978-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Security (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0162-2889 • E-ISSN: 1531-4804 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2538459 |
| OpenAlex | W1971550942 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 3 |
The euphoria in some quarters of the American strategic community following the SALT I accords was largely based upon the inference that Soviet agreement to a virtual ABM ban signified fundamental agreement on strategic nuclear doctrine. Many concluded that this provided a hopeful basis for further collaboration in strategic nuclear arms control. Subsequent disillusionment has been triggered by the slow pace of SALT II and the continuing Soviet strategic buildup.1 The result has been a growing pessimism that divergent strategic doctrines preclude significant strategic accommodation. One strain of determined optimism about SALT even argues that reconciliation of nuclear doctrine be placed first on the SALT agenda, as a necessary basis for substantive agreement.2 There are, however, structural and ideological barriers to any explicit reconciliation of nuclear doctrine. Barring the mostthorough-going transformation of the Soviet system, these appear insurmountable. Until 1953, Soviet military thought, like all other significant aspects of Soviet life, was constrained by a primitive Stalinist orthodoxy. In military thought, this orthodoxy did not extend beyond the assertion of the decisiveness of Stalin's so-called permanently operating factors. These were: the stability of the rear; the morale of the armed forces; the quantity and quality of divisions; the equipment of the fighting forces; and the organizational abilities of the commanders.3 Coupled with the asserted superiority of the Soviet social order, based upon the Marxist-Leninist science of society, these factors amounted to a theological assertion that the Soviet Union would prevail in any future conflict. This recipe, expounded by the greatest military genius of modern times, precluded the possibility that other factors, such as nuclear weapons or the element of surprise, could affect the outcome of war. Not only was this a prescription for avoiding reassessment of the lessons of the Great Patriotic War (in which the surprise
Doctrine · Economic history · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Salt (chemistry · Chemistry · History · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,15 |
| Citation span | 1979 - 2016 (38) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |