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Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism

Bibliographic Data

ID11262384
AuthorsThomas C Schelling (corresponding author)
Year1982
Volume6
Issue4
Pages61
Publication date1982-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Security (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0162-2889 • E-ISSN: 1531-4804
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2538678
OpenAlexW2046785525
LanguageEN
Citations received13

Sometime in the 1980s an that is not a national government may acquire a few nuclear weapons. If not in the 1980s then in the 1990s. The likelihood will grow as more and more national governments acquire fissionable material from their own weapon programs, their research programs, their reactor-fuel programs, or from the waste products of their electric power reactors. By organization I mean a political movement, a government in exile, a separatist or secessionist party, a military rebellion, adventurers from the underground or the underworld, or even some group of people merely bent on showing that it can be done. My list is not a definition, just a sample of the possibilities. Two decades of concern about the proliferation of weapons have generated a familiar list of national governments that may have motive and opportunity to possess weapons-grade fissionable material, and some ideas about how they might behave if they had it and what they might use it for. But there is also a possibility that somebody other than a government may possess the stuff. Who they might be and how they might acquire it are related questions. While not impossible, it is unlikely that an entity not subject to nationalgovernment regulation could independently obtain and enrich uranium for use in explosives or could produce plutonium as a reactor product and refine it for weapons use. There are undoubtedly corporations technically and financially able to do it, but not many with both the motive and the opportunity to do it without being apprehended by an adversely interested party. Access to weapons or a weapon program, or to an authorized nuclear fuel cycle, or to an official research establishment licensed and authorized by some national government is currently the only way to do it. Identifying the opportunities and the access to those opportunities generates some answers to the question Who? Theft of weapons is an obvious possibility. As far as we know, it hasn't happened. Despite the thousands in existence, including the thousands on

Fissile material · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Nuclear weapon · Plutonium · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Product (mathematics · Sociology · Terrorism · Law · Nuclear and radioactivity studies · Nuclear Issues and Defense

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    Peter Alan Sproat•Terrorism and Political Violence•1997

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    Open Access•Farah Naz•Journal of Aggression Conflict…•2022

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    Alex S Wilner•Journal of Strategic Studies•2011

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    Alex S Wilner•Studies in Conflict and Terrorism•2010

  • A Defensible Defense

    Robert J Art•International Security•1991

  • The ‘New Terrorism

    Open Access•Antony Field•Political Studies Review•2009

  • Defending the “Acquisition-Use Presumption” in Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism

    Open Access•Mark S Bell•International Studies Quarterly•2019

  • Between Acquisition and Use

    Christopher Mcintosh, Ian Storey et al.•International Studies Quarterly•2018

  • Atoms for Terror? Nuclear Programs and Non-Catastrophic Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

    Open Access•Bryan R Early, Matthew Fuhrmann et al.•British Journal of Political…•2013

  • Less is more

    Jordan Seng•Security Studies•1997

Unique citing works13
Citations per year0,37
Citation span1991 - 2022 (32)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 10

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