Counterforce and Alliance
The Ultimate Connection
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11262883 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Earl C Ravenal (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1982 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 26 |
| Publication date | 1982-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Security (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0162-2889 • E-ISSN: 1531-4804 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2538676 |
| OpenAlex | W2025545447 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 20 |
| References cited | 1 |
I America's drift to counterforce nuclear strategies is neither perverse nor accidental. The emphasis on counterforce became a notable aspect of the nuclear strategy of the Carter Administration, at least in its promulgation of Presidential Directive 59 in July 1980 and its promotion of the MX intercontinental missile; and it continues in the strategy of the Reagan Administration, embodied in the weapons system decisions of October 2, 1981. To grasp the rationale of counterforce, it is necessary to understand the logic of extended deterrence. For ultimately it is its adherence to alliance commitments that skews the United States' strategy toward counterforce weapons and targeting and warps American doctrines of response toward the first use of nuclear weapons, prejudicing crisis stability and increasing the likelihood of escalation to nuclear war. Few realize how intertwined American weapons and strategies are with American commitments. And few understand how integral to the entire foreign policy stance of the United States has been the strategic paradigm of deterrence and alliance that the U.S. has maintained for thirty-five yearsand therefore, how much would have to change, if we set about to achieve an alternative, more stable, nuclear stance that might provide greater safety for Americans in an age of pervasive nuclear danger. But also, few see how much is actually changing, under the surface of the familiar strategic and diplomatic arrangements, precisely because the objective conditions that are the requisites of America's present stance are not being fulfilled
Alliance · Connection (principal bundle · Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Structural engineering · Engineering · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense
Technology and the Arms Race
Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe
Conventional deep strike
Securing the “ Anchor of Regional Stability”
Congress, The Constitution, and First Use of Nuclear Weapons
The political effects of information warfare
Deterrence by mutual assured destruction or strategic defense
Nuclear weapons and credibility
Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet)
The Limits of Damage Limitation
From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing
Stability and change in nuclear thinking
West German elite views on national security issues
War‐fighting for deterrence
Alliances and Collective Goods
Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance
A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs
Anthony Giddens on Nuclear Strategy
Ordnungspolitik und Sicherheitspolitik als Elemente der Sicherungspolitik
Some (Western) Dilemmas in Managing Extended Deterrence
| Unique citing works | 20 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,47 |
| Citation span | 1983 - 2025 (43) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 20 |