Hume’s Projectivist Legacy for Environmental Ethics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11266582 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul Haught (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 77-96 |
| Publication date | 2006-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Environmental Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0163-4275 • E-ISSN: 2153-7895 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/enviroethics200628140 |
| OpenAlex | W1993900911 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
Hume’s projectivist theory of value suggests that (environmental) values are either individually or culturally relative and that intrinsic value ascriptions are incoherent. Previous attempts to avert these implications have typically relied on modified Humean accounts that either universalize human sensitivity to the value of the more-than-human world or that adapt the concept of intrinsic value to suit a world in which all values are projected. While there are merits to these approaches, there is another alternative. Hume’s own moral theory promises to be an even richer source for environmental ethical discourse than previously thought, and this richness is owed in large part to the robustness of Hume’s theory of virtue
Applied philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · General interest · Sociology · Value theory · Virtue · Virtue ethics · Computer Science · Environmental Philosophy and Ethics · Philosophy · Religion, Ecology, and Ethics
| Citations per year | 0.12 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2009 - 2021 (13) |
| Highly cited | No |