A Phenomenological Actus Essendi? Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Edith Stein on Finite Existence

In later Edith Stein and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, finite existence appears to be necessarily intertwined with infinite being. In response to this observation, this paper puts particular focus on the experience of finite being in order to address the specifically phenomenological (i.e., experiential) aspects of Stein’s and Conrad-Martius’ metaphysics. As a consequence, instead of pointing to eternal or infinite being, finite experience is understood to – less specifically – transcend itself. Using the notion of actus essendi (priority of existence over essence), I identify two ideas as specifically characterizing this transcendence: non-ownership of time (in Conrad-Martius), by which is questioned the coherence of inner time consciousness, as well as non-ownership of sense (in Stein), stipulating that the sense one intuitively and intellectively experiences in reference to objects is discovered, rather than made. Subsequently, the paper discusses how Stein’s and Conrad-Martius’ metaphysics of finite existence is reflected in their critical assessments of Heidegger’s existential finitude

Consciousness · Epistemology · Existentialism · Metaphysics · Phenomenology (philosophy · Psychoanalysis · Transcendence (philosophy · Kierkegaardian Philosophy and Influence · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Psychology

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