Condorcet domains on at most seven alternatives

Bibliographic Data

ID11284307
AuthorsDolica Akello-Egwel (0009-0007-0096-3666), Charles Leedham-Green, C R Leedham-Green, Alastair Litterick (0000-0002-1355-258X), Klas Markström (0000-0002-6344-1642), Søren Rii (0000-0003-0697-4116), Søren Riis (0000-0002-3984-1638)
Year2025
Volume133
Pages23-33
Publication date2025-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueMathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118
PublisherElsevier BV (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.002
OpenAlexW4405365743
LanguageEN
References cited32

A Condorcet domain is a collection of linear orders which avoid Condorcet's paradox for majority voting. We have developed a new algorithm for complete enumeration of all maximal Condorcet domains and, using a supercomputer, obtained the first enumeration of all maximal Condorcet domains on n≤7 alternatives. We investigate properties of these domains and use this study to resolve several open questions regarding Condorcet domains, and propose several new conjectures. Following this we connect our results to other domain types used in voting theory, such a non-dictatorial and strategy-proof domains. All our data are made freely available on the web

Condorcet method · Econometrics · Economics · Mathematical economics · Political science · Voting · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Multi-Criteria Decision Making

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