Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser
A characterization of the plurality with a runoff
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11284403 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Shin Sato (0000-0001-9359-9400, Fukuoka University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 79 |
| Pages | 11-19 |
| Publication date | 2016-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.10.003 |
| OpenAlex | W2173815453 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
Anonymity · Computer security · Condorcet method · Economics · Majority rule · Mathematical economics · Monotonic function · Neutrality · Social choice theory · Voting · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Law · Mathematics · Artificial Intelligence
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |