Perfectly almost strict equilibria for finite games in strategic form
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11286010 |
|---|---|
| Authors | M Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro (0000-0002-2705-0601, Universidade de Vigo, corresponding author), Ignacio Garcı́a-Jurado (0000-0002-6681-1629, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela) |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 269-276 |
| Publication date | 1997-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/s0165-4896(96)00836-0 |
| OpenAlex | W1963880029 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 3 |
Best response · Epsilon-equilibrium · Equilibrium selection · Extension (predicate logic · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Nash equilibrium · Repeated game · Strategy · Trembling hand perfect equilibrium · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |