Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11286659 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mamoru Kaneko (0000-0001-6858-9139, Virginia Tech, corresponding author), T Nagashima (0000-0001-9125-8469, Hitotsubashi University) |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 229-255 |
| Publication date | 1991-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/0165-4896(91)90024-l |
| OpenAlex | W2034455333 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 16 |
Axiom · Best response · Interpretation (philosophy · Mathematical economics · Nash equilibrium · Computer Science · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
Non-Cooperative Games
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Agreeing to Disagree
Two-Person Cooperative Games
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
The Bargaining Problem
The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I
| Citations per year | 0.1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1995 - 1999 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |