The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies in the emergence of cooperative group norms
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11289740 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Miguel Salazar (0000-0001-6345-5924, Masaryk University), Daniel J Shaw (0000-0003-1139-8301, Central European Institute of Technology, corresponding author), Kristína Czekóová (0000-0001-9198-1083, Central European Institute of Technology), Rostislav Staněk (0000-0002-6310-4777, Masaryk University), Milan Brázdil (0000-0001-7979-2343, Central European Institute of Technology) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 90 |
| Pages | 102520 |
| Publication date | 2022-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Economic Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0167-4870 • E-ISSN: 1872-7719 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520 |
| OpenAlex | W4221106907 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 54 |
Norms for cooperation are essential for groups to function effectively, yet there are often strong incentives for group members to behave selfishly. Direct and indirect reciprocity can help to discourage such uncooperative behaviour by punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators, but require explicit means for punishment and tally-keeping. What, then, encourages an individual to cooperate with their group when others cannot track the behaviour of others? We adapted the Bargaining Game to examine the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among 20 groups of six anonymous players (N = 120) who interacted amongst themselves over recursive bargaining exchanges. By estimating the expected utility that drives players’ demands in these interactions, we demonstrate that their behaviour on each exchange reflects the demands placed upon them previously. Thus, we highlight the role of generalised reciprocity in such situations; that is, when an individual passes on to another member of their group the behaviour they have received previously. Furthermore, we identify four distinct behavioural types that differ in their expressions of generalised reciprocity: Some players converge quickly on cooperative demands regardless of the behaviour they received from their co-players, and are therefore characterised by low expressions of reciprocity. In contrast, individuals with strong reciprocal tendencies decrease their demands over successive interactions in response to the behaviour of their group. By simulating groups with different compositions of these player types, we reveal the strong influence of individual differences in reciprocal tendencies on the emergence of cooperative group dynamics
Economics · Function (biology · Game theory · Group (periodic table · Incentive · Microeconomics · Non-cooperative game · Norm of reciprocity · Political science · Punishment (psychology · Reciprocal · Reciprocity (cultural anthropology · Social capital · Strong reciprocity · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Psychology · Social Psychology
Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation
The Evolution of Conventions
When Does "Economic Man" Dominate Social Behavior?
The Split-Apply-Combine Strategy for Data Analysis
McLust 5
Parochial trust and cooperation across 17 societies
The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game
A meta‐analytic review of help giving and aggression from an attributional perspective
Measuring Empathic Tendencies
G*Power 3
The Structure of Human Prosociality
Self and Nation
Social influence in small groups
Group interaction as the crucible of social identity formation
Social Value Orientation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Reciprocity anxiety
Belief heterogeneity and contributions decay among conditional cooperators in public goods games
Do what (you think) the rich will do
Measuring indirect reciprocity
Learning to be selfish? A large-scale longitudinal analysis of Dictator games played on Amazon Mechanical Turk
Empathy‐induced altruism in a prisoner's dilemma II
The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment
The dynamic emergence of cooperative norms in a social dilemma
How many bad apples does it take to spoil the whole barrel?”
Escalation of negative social exchange
Measuring individual differences in empathy
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1.67 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |