Self-serving bias in redistribution choices
Accounting for beliefs and norms
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11288628 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dianna R Amasino (0000-0001-9092-3877, Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences, corresponding author), Davide Pace (Tinbergen Institute), Davide Domenico Pace, Joël J Van Der Weele (0000-0002-1855-9289, Tinbergen Institute), Joël van der Weele |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 98 |
| Pages | 102654 |
| Publication date | 2023-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Economic Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0167-4870 • E-ISSN: 1872-7719 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102654 |
| OpenAlex | W4384207782 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 49 |
We explore the psychological mechanisms underlying self-serving redistribution decisions in an experimental setting. This self-serving bias in redistribution has been attributed not only to self-interest, but also to constructs such as differing beliefs about the hard work or luck underlying inequality, differing fairness views, and differing perceptions of social norms. In this study, we directly measure each of these potential mechanisms and compare their mediating roles in the relationship between status and redistribution. In our experiment, participants complete real-effort tasks and then are randomly assigned a high or low pay rate per correct answer to exogenously induce (dis)advantaged status. Participants are then paired and those assigned the role of dictator decide how to divide their joint earnings. We find that advantaged dictators keep more for themselves than disadvantaged dictators and report different fairness views and beliefs about task performance, but not different perceptions of social norms. Further, only fairness views play a significant mediating role between status and allocation differences, suggesting this is the primary mechanism underlying self-serving differences in support for redistribution
Dictator game · Disadvantaged · Earnings · Economics · Inequality · Inequity aversion · Luck · Perception · Political science · Redistribution (election · Social preferences · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2024 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |