What makes cooperation precarious
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11289907 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christoph Engel (0000-0001-8451-3599), Bettina Rockenbach (0000-0003-2624-1964, University of Cologne) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 101 |
| Pages | 102712 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Economic Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0167-4870 • E-ISSN: 1872-7719 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102712 |
| OpenAlex | W4391918615 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 7 |
Although most people are not outright selfish, cooperation frequently fails. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) explain the well-established decline of contributions in repeated public good games with a genuine imperfection in conditional cooperation. Reanalyzing their data, we offer a more nuanced explanation. Conditional cooperators are nearly perfect, when others cooperate as well. Yet conditional cooperators strongly react to negative experiences, chiefly caused by selfish individuals. These bad experiences are the main driver for the imperfection in conditional cooperation and thus of the downward trend in contributions in repeated public good games
Economics · Microeconomics · Positive economics · Public good · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Social Psychology
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
Public Goods
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Reciprocity
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |