Reasons, Causes, and Intentional Explanation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11308127 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Frederick Stoutland (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1986 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 28-55 |
| Publication date | 1986-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Analyse & Kritik (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0171-5860 • E-ISSN: 2365-9858 |
| Publisher | Walter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1515/auk-1986-0102 |
| OpenAlex | W2403023566 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 4 |
The reasons-causes debate concerns whether explanations of human behavior in terms of an agent's reasons presuppose causal laws. This paper considers three approaches to this debate: the covering law model which holds that there are causal laws covering both reasons and behavior, the intentionalist approach which denies any role to causal laws, and Donald Davidson’s point of view which denies that causal laws connect reasons and behavior, but holds that reasons and behavior must be covered by physical laws if reasons explanations are to be valid. I defend the intentionalist approach against the two causalist approaches and conclude with reflections on the significance of the debate for the social sciences
Causal model · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.23 |
| Citation span | 1987 - 2002 (16) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |