The power of positional competition and market mechanism

A case study of recent parental choice development in China

Bibliographic Data

ID11488015
AuthorsXiaoxin Wu (0000-0001-9785-8916, Guangxi University, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume23
Issue6
Pages595-614
Publication date2008-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Education Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0268-0939 • E-ISSN: 1464-5106
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/02680930802209735
OpenAlexW2059378294
LanguageEN
Citations received21
References cited25

The positional competition reflected in the current parental choice fever in China is highlighted by the introduction of market mechanisms: buying houses near preferred schools, paying choice fees or co‐founding fees, giving donations and spending money on spare time training classes, etc. All of these work effectively together with the traditional tools of power and guanxi in carrying out one’s parental choice. The involvement of huge amounts of choice fee money has resulted in changes in government policies that work to the middle classes’ advantage by giving the green light to the intake of choice students in senior middle schools and allowing the former key primary schools and junior middle schools to change into ‘converted schools’ for the sake of charging high choice fees in a legal way. The development of the series of government policies has resulted in a shift of the parental choice process from being a meritocratic competition to a largely private competition between families based in large part on wealth, power and guanxi

Business · China · Competition (biology · Economics · Government (linguistics · Guanxi · Market economy · Meritocracy · Political science · Power (physics · School choice · Work (physics · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Global Educational Reforms and Inequalities · Law · School Choice and Performance · Marketing

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