Limits to cooperation
Iterated graduated games and the arms race
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11896014 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael D Mcginnis (Indiana University Bloomington, corresponding author), Michael Mcginnis (0000-0001-7670-8337) |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 271-293 |
| Publication date | 1991-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Interactions (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0305-0629 • E-ISSN: 1547-7444 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/03050629108434762 |
| OpenAlex | W1982521933 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 34 |
The arms race is often modeled as mutual defection in a Prisoner's Dilemma game and arms control as reciprocal cooperation in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game, while Chicken and other games are used to represent different aspects of superpower rivalry. This paper develops a model of the macro‐structure of superpower rivalry in which each of these games occur at different levels of military expenditures or other measures of military effort. In this iterated graduated game model the two rival states repeatedly select from an ordered sequence of policy options, and each state experiences tradeoffs among the desire to gain an advantage over the rival, the dangers of escalation, and the intrinsic benefits and opportunity costs of military expenditures. Analysis of numerical examples demonstrates that equilibrium in this model corresponds to the intermediate levels of cooperation and conflict characteristic of superpower rivalry. A concluding discussion indicates that this model is also consistent with the existence of policy competition among domestic groups with conflicting interests
Arms race · Competition (biology · Dilemma · Economics · Game theory · Iterated function · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Prisoner's dilemma · Rivalry · Superpower · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Law · Mathematics · Political Conflict and Governance
Superpower Games
Prospect Theory
Social Choice and Individual Values
Conflict Among Nations
Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics
Models of Man
Arms Race Models
Deterrence games and social choice
The Long Peace
Cooperation among egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games
Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation
Arms Races and Cooperation
The Game Theory of International Politics
International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and “Nice” Laws
"The Science of "Muddling Through
Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation
When Is an Arms Rivalry a Prisoner's Dilemma
Strategies for Eliciting Cooperation from an Adversary
International Escalation and the Dollar Auction
Perceptual Illusions and Military Realities
Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War
Prisoner's Dilemma" and "Chicken" Models in International Politics
A Rational Model of Regional Rivalry
Stability in Richardson's Arms Races and Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Arms Rivalries
Human Nature in Politics
The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
The President and the Political Use of Force
Promise and Performance
Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,06 |
| Citation span | 1991 - 1995 (5) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |