Peer Monitoring, Social Ties and Moral Hazard in Group Lending Programs
Evidence from Eritrea
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11916634 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Niels Hermes (0000-0002-8364-8026, University of Groningen, corresponding author), Robert Lensink (0000-0001-6448-5164, University of Groningen), Habteab T Mehrteab (University of Asmara) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 149-169 |
| Publication date | 2004-12-09 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | World Development (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0305-750X • E-ISSN: 1873-5991 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.09.001 |
| OpenAlex | W2042806438 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 18 |
| References cited | 11 |
Economics · Group (periodic table · Hazard · Incentive · Interpersonal ties · Microeconomics · Moral hazard · Peer group · Political science · FinTech, Crowdfunding, Digital Finance · Islamic Finance and Banking Studies · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion · Psychology · Social Psychology
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On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring
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| Unique citing works | 18 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,95 |
| Citation span | 2007 - 2025 (19) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 18 |