Koalitionstendenzen in der Tetrade / Coalition tendencies in the tetrad
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11981053 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hans-Dieter Schneider (Universität Zürich, Psychologisches Institut, Rietlianstraße 6 CH-8804 Au (ZH), corresponding author) |
| Year | 1977 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 77-90 |
| Publication date | 1977-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Zeitschrift für Soziologie (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0340-1804 • E-ISSN: 2366-0325 |
| Publisher | De Gruyter (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1515/zfsoz-1977-0105 |
| OpenAlex | W163810974 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
The study examines several well-known and some newly proposed theories of coalition formation by asking subjects to imagine themselves in circumscribed situations and - knowing all resources - to choose one or several coalition partners in the tetrad. The coalition tendencies are not predicted by one unique theory but by a bundle of theories in which the sometimes competing detail theories have their specific range of application. The findings corroborate the partial value of the theory of minimal resources (GAMSON), of maximal resources (new), of anticompetitiveness (VINACKE), of alliance of the similar (new). Secondorder theories like the thesis of preponderance of two-way coalitions (WILLIS) and the thesis of topic-dependent coalition behavior (new) are influencing the first-order tendencies. The theory of maximal control (CAPLOW) and the theory of rational behavior (VINACKE) on the other hand are less well confirmed
Alliance · Economics · Mathematical economics · Order (exchange · Political science · Sociology · Tetrad · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |