Minimum Resource and Pivotal Power Theories
A Competitive Test in Four-Person Coalitional Situations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284847 |
|---|---|
| Authors | H Andrew Michener (Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin-Madison), John A Fleishman (Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin-Madison), Jerry J Vaske (0000-0002-6703-2264, Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin-Madison), Gerald R Statza (Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin-Madison) |
| Year | 1975 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 89-107 |
| Publication date | 1975-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277501900105 |
| OpenAlex | W2124944329 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 11 |
This paper reports a competitive test of minimum resource and pivotal power theories in tetradic situations. Using resource distributions for which the theories make distinct predictions, the study obtained data on the formation of coalitions and the division of payoffs. Results indicate that minimum resource theory is superior to pivotal power theory in predicting coalition formation, especially for resource distributions where one member has veto capabilities. The theories perform equally well in predicting payoff division, with each able to explain a large proportion of the variation. Both theories are more accurate in predicting payoff division for nonveto situations than for veto situations
Division (mathematics · Econometrics · Economics · Management · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Operations research · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Resource (disambiguation · Resource allocation · Resource dependence theory · Shared resource · Stochastic game · Veto · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics
A test of the bargaining theory of coalition formation in four-person groups
Self-interest and fairness in coalition formation
Do Groups Exclude Others More Readily Than Individuals in Coalition Formation
Koalitionstendenzen in der Tetrade / Coalition tendencies in the tetrad
The interplay of self‐interest and equity in coalition formation
Do-no-harm in coalition formation
A Research Note on the Predictive Adequacy of the Kernel
Coalizões Sul-Sul e multilateralismo
Experimental Design: Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences
A Value for n-Person Games
Coalitions in the Tetrad
Coalitions in the Triad
Coalition formation as a function of differences in resources
A Theory of Coalition Formation
An Experimental Test of a Theory of Coalition Formation
An Experimental Study of Coalitions in the Triad
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,16 |
| Citation span | 1976 - 2008 (33) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |