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A Research Note on the Predictive Adequacy of the Kernel

Bibliographic Data

ID7878264
AuthorsH Andrew Michener (University of Wisconsin–Madison), Melvin M Sakurai (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
Year1976
Volume20
Issue1
Pages129-142
Publication date1976-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/002200277602000105
OpenAlexW2160773258
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited8

The kernel, a game-theoretic solution concept, was tested competitively against minimum resource and pivotal power theories. Experimental data from six veto and six nonveto weighted-majority games served as the basis of the test. The kernel proved to be consistently inferior to both minimum resource and pivotal power theories in predicting payoffs

Discrete mathematics · Econometrics · Epistemology · Kernel (algebra · Kernel method · Mathematical economics · Multiple kernel learning · Political science · Predictive power · Resource (disambiguation · Support vector machine · Test (biology · Veto · Artificial Intelligence · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computer Science · Ecology · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy

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    H Andrew Michener, John A Fleishman et al.•Journal of Personality and Social…•1976

  • Bargaining set theory and stability in coalition governments

    Open Access•Norman Schofield•Mathematical Social Sciences•1982

  • Number of coalitions and resources as sources of power in coalition bargaining

    David A Kravitz, John Iwaniszek•Journal of Personality and Social…•1984

  • Effects of resources and alternatives on coalition formation

    David A Kravitz•Journal of Personality and Social…•1981

  • The power of a coalition and payoff disbursement in three‐person negotiable conflicts

    Amnon Rapoport, James P Kahan•Journal of Mathematical Sociology•1982

  • A Test of M1(im) Bargaining Sets in Sidepayment Games

    Open Access•H Andrew Michener, Kenneth Yuen•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1983

  • Quota vs positional power in four-person apex games

    Open Access•Sandra G Funk, Amnon Rapoport et al.•Journal of Experimental Social…•1980

  • Large Group Bargaining in a Characteristic Function Game

    Open Access•J Keith Murnighan, Alvin E Roth•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1978

  • A Competitive Test of the M1(i) and M1(im) Bargaining Sets

    Open Access•H Andrew Michener, Melvin M Sakurai et al.•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1979

  • A Value for n-Person Games

    Lloyd S Shapley•Contributions to the Theory of…•1953

  • Minimum Resource and Pivotal Power Theories

    Open Access•H Andrew Michener, John A Fleishman et al.•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1975

  • A Theory of Coalition Formation

    William A Gamson•American Sociological Review•1961

  • An Experimental Test of a Theory of Coalition Formation

    William A Gamson•American Sociological Review•1961

Unique citing works9
Citations per year0,18
Citation span1976 - 1984 (9)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 9

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