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Melvin M Sakurai

Biographic Data

ID1703926
NAMEMelvin M Sakurai
GIVEN NAMESMelvin M
FAMILY NAMESakurai
SIGNATURESAKURAI M M
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Wisconsin
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS14
AUTHOR COUNT4
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1975
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1990
H-INDEX3
  • Modeling Strategic Threats

    Open Access•Melvin M Sakurai•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1990

    This study evaluates the importance of accurately modeling strategic threats in complex multilateral conflict-of-interest decision problems. The objective is to improve prescriptive accuracy when cooperative n-person game theory is applied to the analysis of such problems. A competitive experiment compares the von Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function v and Harsanyi function H in terms of descriptive accuracy. Results indicate that H is sig…

  • A Competitive Test of the M1(i) and M1(im) Bargaining Sets

    Open Access•H Andrew Michener, Melvin M Sakurai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1979•Cited by: 3•References: 12

    Two game theoretic solution theories, the M1(i) bargaining set and the M1(im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M1(im) is significantly and consistently superior to M1(i) in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p <.01). Results are discussed in terms of the formal differences bet…

  • A Research Note on the Predictive Adequacy of the Kernel

    Open Access•H Andrew Michener, Melvin M Sakurai•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1976•Cited by: 8•References: 8

    The kernel, a game-theoretic solution concept, was tested competitively against minimum resource and pivotal power theories. Experimental data from six veto and six nonveto weighted-majority games served as the basis of the test. The kernel proved to be consistently inferior to both minimum resource and pivotal power theories in predicting payoffs

  • Small Group Cohesiveness and Detrimental Conformity

    Melvin M Sakurai•ARTICLE•Sociometry•1975•Cited by: 3

  • A Research Note on the Predictive Adequacy of the Kernel

    Open Access•H Andrew Michener, Melvin M Sakurai•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1976•Cited by: 8•References: 8

    The kernel, a game-theoretic solution concept, was tested competitively against minimum resource and pivotal power theories. Experimental data from six veto and six nonveto weighted-majority games served as the basis of the test. The kernel proved to be consistently inferior to both minimum resource and pivotal power theories in predicting payoffs

  • A Competitive Test of the M1(i) and M1(im) Bargaining Sets

    Open Access•H Andrew Michener, Melvin M Sakurai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1979•Cited by: 3•References: 12

    Two game theoretic solution theories, the M1(i) bargaining set and the M1(im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M1(im) is significantly and consistently superior to M1(i) in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p <.01). Results are discussed in terms of the formal differences bet…

  • Small Group Cohesiveness and Detrimental Conformity

    Melvin M Sakurai•ARTICLE•Sociometry•1975•Cited by: 3

  • Small Group Cohesiveness and Detrimental Conformity

    Melvin M Sakurai•ARTICLE•Sociometry•1975•Cited by: 3

  • A Research Note on the Predictive Adequacy of the Kernel

    Open Access•H Andrew Michener, Melvin M Sakurai•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1976•Cited by: 8•References: 8

    The kernel, a game-theoretic solution concept, was tested competitively against minimum resource and pivotal power theories. Experimental data from six veto and six nonveto weighted-majority games served as the basis of the test. The kernel proved to be consistently inferior to both minimum resource and pivotal power theories in predicting payoffs

  • A Competitive Test of the M1(i) and M1(im) Bargaining Sets

    Open Access•H Andrew Michener, Melvin M Sakurai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1979•Cited by: 3•References: 12

    Two game theoretic solution theories, the M1(i) bargaining set and the M1(im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M1(im) is significantly and consistently superior to M1(i) in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p <.01). Results are discussed in terms of the formal differences bet…

  • Modeling Strategic Threats

    Open Access•Melvin M Sakurai•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1990

    This study evaluates the importance of accurately modeling strategic threats in complex multilateral conflict-of-interest decision problems. The objective is to improve prescriptive accuracy when cooperative n-person game theory is applied to the analysis of such problems. A competitive experiment compares the von Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function v and Harsanyi function H in terms of descriptive accuracy. Results indicate that H is sig…

Computer Science (3 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Test (biology (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works)

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