A Test of M1(im) Bargaining Sets in Sidepayment Games

Bibliographic Data

ID10071476
AuthorsH Andrew Michener, Kenneth Yuen (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Year1983
Volume27
Issue1
Pages109-135
Publication date1983-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0022002783027001004
OpenAlexW2004989668
LanguageEN
References cited15

This article reports an experimental test of the M 1 (im) Cooperative and M 1 (im) Shapley bargaining set solutions in 3-person superadditive, sidepayment games with nonempty core. The results indicate that, on an overall basis, M 1 (im) Cooperative has greater predictive accuracy than does M 1 (im) Shapley. The data also indicate that M 1 (im) Cooperative is comparatively more accurate in games in which the equality vector located inside the core and in games in which the strength of the 13 coalition is high. These findings are consistent with the view that variations in game properties may affect the salience of different standards of fairness that underlie the M 1 (im) bargaining set

Cognitive psychology · Core (optical fiber · Economics · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Salience (neuroscience · Set (abstract data type · Shapley Value · Superadditivity · Test (biology · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology

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