Kenneth Yuen
Biographic Data
| ID | 4382595 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kenneth Yuen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kenneth |
| FAMILY NAME | Yuen |
| SIGNATURE | YUEN K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Wisconsin |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1979 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Choices of (in)action in obesity
The obesity epidemic has crossed social-demographic barriers and is a matter of significant concern. Why do individuals fail to restrain from eating high-calorie foods and fail to follow treatment routines that reduce the risk of health complications? These questions have been addressed through behavioral and brain imaging studies on prefrontal cortex inhibitory mechanisms. Failure to inhibit undesirable behaviors has become a hallmark of obesity…
A Test of M1(im) Bargaining Sets in Sidepayment Games
This article reports an experimental test of the M 1 (im) Cooperative and M 1 (im) Shapley bargaining set solutions in 3-person superadditive, sidepayment games with nonempty core. The results indicate that, on an overall basis, M 1 (im) Cooperative has greater predictive accuracy than does M 1 (im) Shapley. The data also indicate that M 1 (im) Cooperative is comparatively more accurate in games in which the equality vector located inside the cor…
Nonsymmetry and Core Size in N-Person Sidepayment Games
This article presents a procedure for indexing n-person cooperative games in terms of degree of nonsymmetry. This ordinal-level index is limited to sidepayment games, but applies generally to games of three or more players. To validate the index, a laboratory experiment was conducted with four-person games differing in degree of nonsymmetry and in core size. The results show that, while core size had no significant effects, the players' payoffs v…
A Competitive Test of the M1(i) and M1(im) Bargaining Sets
Two game theoretic solution theories, the M1(i) bargaining set and the M1(im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M1(im) is significantly and consistently superior to M1(i) in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p <.01). Results are discussed in terms of the formal differences bet…
Nonsymmetry and Core Size in N-Person Sidepayment Games
This article presents a procedure for indexing n-person cooperative games in terms of degree of nonsymmetry. This ordinal-level index is limited to sidepayment games, but applies generally to games of three or more players. To validate the index, a laboratory experiment was conducted with four-person games differing in degree of nonsymmetry and in core size. The results show that, while core size had no significant effects, the players' payoffs v…
A Competitive Test of the M1(i) and M1(im) Bargaining Sets
Two game theoretic solution theories, the M1(i) bargaining set and the M1(im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M1(im) is significantly and consistently superior to M1(i) in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p <.01). Results are discussed in terms of the formal differences bet…
A Competitive Test of the M1(i) and M1(im) Bargaining Sets
Two game theoretic solution theories, the M1(i) bargaining set and the M1(im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M1(im) is significantly and consistently superior to M1(i) in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p <.01). Results are discussed in terms of the formal differences bet…
Nonsymmetry and Core Size in N-Person Sidepayment Games
This article presents a procedure for indexing n-person cooperative games in terms of degree of nonsymmetry. This ordinal-level index is limited to sidepayment games, but applies generally to games of three or more players. To validate the index, a laboratory experiment was conducted with four-person games differing in degree of nonsymmetry and in core size. The results show that, while core size had no significant effects, the players' payoffs v…
A Test of M1(im) Bargaining Sets in Sidepayment Games
This article reports an experimental test of the M 1 (im) Cooperative and M 1 (im) Shapley bargaining set solutions in 3-person superadditive, sidepayment games with nonempty core. The results indicate that, on an overall basis, M 1 (im) Cooperative has greater predictive accuracy than does M 1 (im) Shapley. The data also indicate that M 1 (im) Cooperative is comparatively more accurate in games in which the equality vector located inside the cor…
Choices of (in)action in obesity
The obesity epidemic has crossed social-demographic barriers and is a matter of significant concern. Why do individuals fail to restrain from eating high-calorie foods and fail to follow treatment routines that reduce the risk of health complications? These questions have been addressed through behavioral and brain imaging studies on prefrontal cortex inhibitory mechanisms. Failure to inhibit undesirable behaviors has become a hallmark of obesity…
Computer Science (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Core (optical fiber (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Game theory (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works)