Institutional opportunism
How electoral fortunes shape preferences for power‐sharing institutions in Latin America
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12010481 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Santiago Alle (0000-0002-0872-0809, Departamento de Ciencias Sociales Universidad de San Andrés Victoria Argentina, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 196-213 |
| Publication date | 2024-07-21 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12472 |
| OpenAlex | W4400894662 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 75 |
Drawing on approximately 4000 face‐to‐face interviews with lower house members from seventeen Latin American countries, this article demonstrates how partisan considerations shape legislators' preferences for power‐sharing institutions. Distributive models argue that reforming parties derive preferences based on potential advantages in power allocation, yet the role of individual legislators remains underexplored. The evidence reveals that legislators favor institutional arrangements that maximize their party's influence. Representatives from larger parties prefer electoral rules that reduce the number of parties in the House, while incumbent lawmakers support a stronger executive. Notably, party positions often shift following changes in electoral fortunes: Parties become more favorable of proportional representation after losing seats and advocate for reinforced congressional authority upon leaving office
Economic system · Economics · Latin Americans · Opportunism · Political economy · Political science · Power (physics · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Society in Latin America
Constitutions of the countries of the world
How Democracy Works
Elbridge Gerry's Salamander
Latin American Party Systems
Presidents and Assemblies
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Setting the Agenda
Institutions and Social Conflict
Making Constitutions
Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models
Why Parties?
Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America
The Endurance of National Constitutions
Legislative Leviathan
Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using lme4
Mixed-Member Electoral Systems
The Politics of Electoral Reform
Institutional Design in New Democracies
The Handbook of Electoral System Choice
Ballot Structure, Candidate Race, and Vote Choice in Brazil
The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems
The future of liberal revolution
Recovering a Basic Space from Elite Surveys
Elbridge Gerry's salamander
The international diffusion of electoral systems
The Competitive Road to Proportional Representation
Federalism and the Number of Parties in Argentine Congressional Elections
The Adoption of Proportional Representation
Disproportional Threat
Assessing Ballot Structure and Split Ticket Voting
Why Politicians Like Electoral Institutions
The Burden of Election Logistics
Gubernatorial Coattails in Mexican Congressional Elections
The Gubernatorial Coattails Effect
Choosing How to Choose Presidents
An intra-party account of electoral system choice
Electoral reform, values and party self-interest
The Politics of Institutional Change
Resignation as Promotion? Executive Turnover and Early Departures in the Argentine Congress, 1983–2017
When dominant parties adopt proportional representation
Parties, Legislators, and the Origins of Proportional Representation
The Ideological Organization of Latin American Legislative Parties
Democraticinstitutions Andregimesurvival
A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral Systems and Redistricting Plans
Political Parties and Institutional Design
The Stakes of Losing Office, Term Limits and Democracy
The Comparative Legislators Database
To Adopt or Not to Adopt Proportional Representation
With a Little Help from the Opposition? Relaxing Term Limits in the Argentine Provinces, 1983–2017
Models of electoral system change
Ballot design and invalid votes
Strategic fools
Democratic Electoral Systems around the world, 1946-2011
Choice sets, gender, and candidate choice in Brazil
A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change
Setting the Rules of the Game
Stacking the States, Stacking the House
Socialist Threat? Radical Party Entry, Electoral Alliances, and the Introduction of Proportional Representation
Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems
Electoral Systems in Latin America
Can Anyone Stop the President? Power Asymmetries and Term Limits in Latin America, 1984-2016
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |