Can Anyone Stop the President? Power Asymmetries and Term Limits in Latin America, 1984-2016
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3019178 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Javier Corrales (0000-0001-7180-2826, Amherst College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 3-25 |
| Publication date | 2016-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Latin American Politics and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1531-426X • E-ISSN: 1548-2456 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1548-2456.2016.00308.x |
| OpenAlex | W2342775269 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 42 |
| References cited | 24 |
Since the late twentieth century, numerous Latin American nations have launched efforts to relax presidential term limits, often successfully. This article discusses the conditions under which countries succeed in relaxing term limits. Drawing from bargaining models and reviewing 36 cases, it makes three arguments. First, actors' preferences are fairly predictable on the basis of officeholding: presidents are the most prominent actors pushing for expansion of term limits; opposition parties lead the resistance. Second, power asymmetry, measured by presidential approval ratings, is the best predictor of success, better than ideology or share of seats in Congress. Third, the only hope for stopping popular presidents rests with ruling parties and the courts, but only when the latter are sufficiently independent
Economics · Ideology · Latin Americans · Limiting · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Engineering · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America
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Dominant Personality and Politically Inexperienced Presidents Challenge Term Limits
Do Shifts in Late-Counted Votes Signal Fraud? Evidence from Bolivia
Populism and the Erosion of Horizontal Accountability in Latin America
Time to go
Legalistic autocrats
Threat or corrective to democracy? The relationship between populism and different models of democracy
Who’s to blame for democratic backsliding
The “Big Five” personality traits of presidents and the relaxation of term limits in Latin America
Institutional constraints and regional incentives for the attempt to scrap presidential term limits
Do contravention attempts affect public support for presidential term limits
Tinkering with executive term limits
Protecting democracy from abroad
Why do authoritarian regimes adopt bicameralism? Cooptation, control, and masking controversial reforms
Can unamendable term limits prevent presidents-for-life
Authoritarianism rising as polls loom
Changing the rules to win the game again
Unravelling democratic erosion
Costs and benefits of accepting presidential term limits
Economic performance and the type and method of presidential term limit evasion
Presidential Term Limit Contravention
Delegating Away Democracy
Executive Approval Dynamics in Presidential and Parliamentary Democratic Regimes
Presidents’ Sex and Popularity
Are Latin American populists more likely to introduce direct democracy
Why do some populist presidents erode liberal democratic institutions more than others in Latin America
Can Anyone Stop the President? Power Asymmetries and Term Limits in Latin America, 1984-2016
Legislative Turnover in Latin America
Querer no siempre es poder
Autocratisation by Term Limits Manipulation in Sub-Saharan Africa
Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America
Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter
Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter
Latin American Neopopulism
Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe
The Missing Variable
Choosing How to Choose Presidents
Los Invencibles
Latin American Presidencies Interrupted
Presidents, Parties, and Referenda in Latin America
Political Parties and Institutional Design
Five Laws of Politics
The Political Economy of Latin America. Reflections on Neoliberalism and Development
The Emerging New Politics of Liberalizing Paraguay
Political Parties
Constitution-making and institutional design. The transformations of presidentialism in Argentina
The Reelection Debate in Latin America
Can Anyone Stop the President? Power Asymmetries and Term Limits in Latin America, 1984-2016
Shifting the Status Quo
| Unique citing works | 42 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,2 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 42 |